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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MANUFACTURER LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
EXPRESS WARRANTY: PRIVITY NOT REQUIRED
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958)
In her petition plaintiff alleged that she had purchased a home
permanent set labelled "Very Gentle" from an independent retailer on
the basis of defendant manufacturer's representations made to her
through national advertising that the product was safe and harmless.
She further alleged that although directions for use had been explicitly
followed harmful ingredients in the product caused her hair to fall off
"to within one-half inch of her scalp." Plaintiff's petition set forth
three causes of action:1 negligence, breach of express warranty, and
breach of implied warranty. The trial court, adhering to the majority
rule requiring privity of contract as an element in actions based on
breach of warranty,2 sustained defendant's demurrer to the second and
third causes of action. The court of appeals reversing in part held that
a cause of action based on breach of an express warranty was pleaded.'
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed and held that a direct contractual
relationship is not required to maintain an action for damages for breach
of an express warranty when the manufacturer has induced the party
injured to purchase his product by representations made through adver-
tising aimed at the consuming public.4 Thus, Ohio has joined the
growing number of jurisdictions where inroads on the requirement of
technical privity have been made in actions based on breach of express
warranty. 
5
1 "Cause of action" in this context denotes theory of recovery.
2 Rachlin v. Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (1938); 46 AM. JUR.
Sales §§ 306, 307 (1943) ; WILLISTON, SALES §§ 244, 244a (Rev. ed. 1948).
3Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E.2d
871 (1957). The court of appeals held that a cause of action based on implied
warranty could not be maintained because of the lack of privity of contract on
the authority of the recent case of Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St.
273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). This issue was not before the Ohio Supreme Court
but the court indicated that a re-examination of that issue would be undertaken
in a proper case. A recent court of appeals case decided on April 2, 1958 squarely
presents the issue by holding in a fact situation substantially the same as that in
the principal case that a cause of action based on breach of implied warranty
could be maintained. Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 78 Ohio L. Abs.
111, 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio App. 1958).
4 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958).
5 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948) (soap package
contained printed guarantee of quality) ; Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App.
779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950) (manufacturer represented automobile to be free
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It is not clear whether the principal case will be construed as dis-
pensing with the privity requirement in all actions against a manu-
facturer who has made false affirmations of fact concerning his product
through advertising aimed at the public. The majority indicated that the
doctrine of the food cases, a widely held exception to the privity re-
quirement in actions based on warranty for injuries sustained because of
defective food or medicine, 6 was being logically extended. The over-
riding public interest that food be fit for consumption has been the
justification for this exception, and the court indicated that the same
reasoning was also applicable to cases in which cosmetics and other
preparations "are sold in sealed packages and designed for application
to the -bodies of humans or animals."'  Prediction of a more liberal
interpretation of the decision than that encompassed by the preceding
quotation seems possible because the court, after noting the widespread
use -by manufacturers of advertising aimed at the consuming public,
remarked that the manufacturer
owes a very real obligation toward those who consume or use
his products. The warranties made by the manufacturer in his
advertisements and by the labels on his products are induce-
ments to the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought
to -be held to strict accountability to any consumer who buys
the product in reliance on such representations and later suffers
injury because the product proves to be defective or deleteri-
ous.
8
It should also be noted that the court did not attempt to distinguish the
earlier case of Jordon v. Brouwer.9 The decision in the latter case con-
flicted with the court of appeals holding in the principal case and led to
review -by the supreme court. In the Jordon case recovery for damages
to plaintiff's automobile because antifreeze purchased from an inde-
from defects in material and workmanship. Held, purchase of automobile by
plaintiff was the consideration for manufacturer's warranty); Bahlman v. Hud-
son Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (automobile manu-
facturer represented top of car to be made of seamless steel) ; Simpson v.
American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (representation on label
that insecticide was non-poisonous to humans); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 88 A.L.R. 521 (1932) (automobile manufacturer rep-
resented windshield to be non-shatterable glass). Cf. Silverman v. Samuel
Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953) where court indicated that
privity of contraqt was not necessary but found that no misrepresentation had
been made. For general discussion of problem of liability of manufacturer to
consumer who purchased from an independent retailer see Annot. 88 A.L.R. 527,
(1934), supplemented by 105 A.L.R. 1502 (1936); 111 A.L.R. 1239 (1937); 140
A.L.R. 191 (1942) ; 142 A.L.R. 1490 (1943).
6Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
7 Supra note 4, at 247, 147 N.E.2d at 614.
8 Supra note 4, at 249, 147 N.E.2d at 615.
9 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949).
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pendent retailer did not meet specifications on the label was denied in an
action against the manufacturer. The court could have distinguished the
Jordon case on the type of product or type of injury involved had it
desired to so limit the scope of its holding.
The rationale of the first case dispensing with the requirement of
technical privity of contract was that national advertising aimed at the
public was a substitute for privity of contract." The Ohio Supreme
Court in the principal case took a more realistic view. After noting that
warranty was originally an extension of the action on the case for deceit
unladen with any contractual implications," the court relied on this tort
aspect of express warranty' 2 and held that privity of contract was not
required.
13
Although the foregoing invites prediction of a liberal interpretation
of the scope of the holding in the principal case, the fact remains that
three judges in a concurring opinion denied recognition of the express
warranty theory of recovery because privity of contract was lacking.
It is interesting to note that Judge Taft in the concurring opinion
construed the petition as pleading a cause of action in deceit and hence
good against demurrer. Unlike its offspring, express warranty, which is
a form of strict liability, deceit is an intentional tort and requires the
additional elements of intent to mislead and knowledge that the affirma-
tion of fact or representation was false.' 4 Thus, on the face of it, the
majority and concurring opinions seem to be diametrically opposed.
However, the recent Ohio Supreme Court case of Pumphrey v. Quillen 5
casts considerable doubt on such an assertion.
In the Pumphrey case the defendant, a real estate agent, induced
the plaintiff to purchase a house by representing the walls to be con-
structed of tile. Approximately six months after moving into the house
the plaintiff removed some wall boards and upon drilling holes through
the exterior walls discovered the walls were constructed of clay with a
10 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 5.
IlAmes, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888); 1
WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-97 (Rev. ed. 1948).
1 2 The UNIFORM SALES AcT recognizes both the tort and contractual aspects
of express warranty. § 12 defines express warranty as: "Any affirmation of fact
or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty....
See 1 WILLIsTON, SALES § 194 (Rev. ed. 1948).
13 Cf. May v. Roberts, 126 Wash. 645, 219 Pac. 55 (1923): "It is immaterial
whether appellants made the representations (if they were made) innocently,
believing them to be true, or fraudulently, knowing them to be false; the result
to the respondent would be the same in either event if he relied on them. The ques-
tion is, were representations made, and not the purpose or intent in making them."
Query whether it was necessary to find that national advertising is a substitute for
privity of contract in the Baxter case, supra note 5, with this test for imposing
liability for deceit?
14 Gleason v. Bell, 91 Ohio St. 268, 110 N.E. 513 (1915); PROSSER, ToRs
§86 (2d ed. 1955).
15 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956).
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tile veneer. In the face of seemingly overwhelming evidence"0 that he
could not have known nor even reasonably believed that the house was
not constructed of tile, the defendant was held liable for deceit. The
court held that a person who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge,
when he knows that he has insufficient information upon which to make
such assertion, may be held liable for deceit. This substitute for actual
knowledge of falsity has been termed "conscious ignorance"' 7 and seems
clearly valid since either actual knowledge of falsity or "conscious
ignorance" indicates the culpable state of mind necessary to constitute an
intentional tort. However, it is submitted that the "conscious ignorance"
concept was misapplied in the Pumphrey case because a finding that the
representation was false in effect foreclosed the possibility that defendant
made the representation in good faith. The evidence does not justify an
inference that defendant knew that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base his representation. It seems clear that Toni could not
escape liability for deceit if the "conscious ignorance" concept be simi-
larly applied.
It is not contended that deceit and the tort aspect of express war-
ranty have merged. Indeed, Judge Taft, who strongly dissented in the
Pumphrey case on the ground that strict liability was being imposed,
cited the Pumphrey case in his concurring opinion in the Toni case as
authority for the "conscious ignorance" concept. Perhaps his allusion
to the Pumplrey case was designed to mitigate the persuasiveness of that
dissent. However the Pumphrey case may be construed in the future, it
indicates at least an inclination toward the imposition of liability for
false representations innocently made.
Perhaps the Pumphrey and Toni cases signal the approach of
Professor Williston's test for imposing liability for false representations
innocently made. It provides:
If a man makes a statement in regard to a matter upon which
his hearer may reasonably suppose he has the means of infor-
mation, and that he is speaking with full knowledge, and the
statement is made as part of a business transaction, or to induce
action from which the speaker expects to gain an advantage,
he should be held liable for his misstatement.' 8
I6The dissent outlined the following as arguments against imposing lia-
bility for deceit: An appraiser had reported the house as masonry for his bank,
thereby enabling plaintiffs to obtain a substantial loan. No evidence was submitted
that defendant knew the walls were constructed of clay. Plaintiff's building expert
witness testified that before removal of the wall he would have thought the
building was constructed of masonry. The previous owners thought the house
was constructed of masonry. There was no evidence that anyone suspected the
true construction of the house until plaintiff removed the wall boards. Id. at
349-50, 135 N.E.2d at 332-33.
1 7 PROSSER, TORTS § 88 (2d. ed. 1955).1 8 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24- HARv. L. REV. 415,
4-37 (1911).
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This test seems to be in accord with the court's results in the Pumphrey
and Toni cases and carefully excludes those cases in which liability for
innocent misrepresentations should clearly not be imposed, i.e., when
defendant has no business interest.19 Professor Williston's test recognizes
an absolute right to rely on representations made in business transactions.
The results of the court's decisions in these two cases indicate an inclina-
tion to recognize such a right; but because express warranty is tied up by
the requirement of privity of contract and deceit is limited to intentional
misrepresentations, the courts are hard pressed to make these ancient rules
apply to their modern concepts of liability.
L. L. Inscore
19 But see Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturer for Injuries Caused by
Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957), for an
argument against the imposition of strict liability against manufacturers.
